Part 3: Iran And The Revolution
Divergent views about US-Iranian Relationship in US
There was a dispute in the U.S. between the two parties regarding the removal of Shah. The Republicans mainly opposed such a move. But, Carter and his aides supported Khomeini without any doubt, and here are some facts to show this: Time magazine published on March 5, 1979, a declaration from Carter responding to his opposition saying, "Those who argue that the U.S. could or should intervene directly to thwart these events are wrong about the realities of Iran."41 President Carter, in his memoirs Keeping Faith, talked about Huyser's mission to Iran by saying:
Huyser believed the military had made adequate plans to protect its the equipment and installations, and that it would stay off the streets. He had dissuaded some of its leaders from attempting a coup and from moving out of other parts of Iran into the more stable southern part."42 Furthermore, President Carter praised Khomeini's first Prime Minister by saying:
He and his predominantly Western-educated cabinet members cooperated with us. They protected our embassy, provided safe travel for General Philip C. Gast, who had replaced Huyser, and sent us a series of friendly messages. Bazargan announced publicly his eagerness to have good relations with the U.S. and said that Iran would soon resume normal oil shipments to all its customers."43
President Carter also praised Khomeini when he said:
Khomeini sent his personal representative to see Secretary Vance to pledge increased friendship and cooperation, and to seek our assurance that we were supporting the new Prime Minister and a stable government. Despite the turmoil within Iran, I was reasonably pleased with the attitude of the Iranian government under Bazargan."44
In an interview with the former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had with CBS program, Face the Nation, he said that the Bazargan government was very helpful in trying to protect Americans in a difficult and unstable, dangerous situation. He added that America can work out friendly relations.45 At that time, the assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Sanders said in his report before the Middle East Committee: "The American interests did not change in Iran, and we have a strong interest to keep Iran a stable, free, and independent state."46 It is true that the American interests in Iran did not change and that the American administration knows best about their interests, especially because they worship their interests. If their interests were in danger, they would take the proper type of action to do what is best about the matter as Carter stated earlier (see above). Leaders of the Republican Party, on the other hand, bitterly opposed. George Bush described Carter as a liar, and he noted that during Carter's visit to Iran on December 31, 1977, the former president said, "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." Bush made a remark about this part of Carter's speech saying that Carter, "at the time, was giving the secret code to the CIA to start destroying Shah's authority." And, as we know, Bush was serving in the CIA, and he was familiar with their tactics.47 On January 7, 1978, the first riots erupted in Iran. Nevertheless, there was a battle between Kissinger and Carter's National Secretary Advisor, Brzezinski. The first blamed the second of hatching a conspiracy against the Shah, and he criticized Carter's attitude towards the Shah, who served the American interests for more than 26 years. In an interview with The Economist on February 10, 1979, which then published a book, Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, showed his support for the Shah. He also showed that the American policy at that time was deliberately directed to oust the Shah.48 As it is clearly evident from these sources --The Shah's memoirs, the accounts of Khomeini's partners, and the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan -- Huyser neutralized the army, and it was not coincidence that different political figures agreed to blame the United States. This blame was reasonable to anybody who followed the core of events which came before Khomeini's victory.
Bazargan's Attitude Towards The United States
In the rest of this section, we would like to bring some proclamations from Bazargan about his country's attitude towards the West, his speech from Tehran radio voicing his opinion of the West, as well as a document from the students who held the hostages and found documents in the American Embassy. One of these documents shows that Bazargan was an agent of the United States, but we believe that Khomeini intervened in favor of his friend, which pacified the students.
In a speech with the New York Times, Bazargan said that his government is willing to maintain a good relationship with the United States, and he renewed his apology about the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran during the first days of his government in office. Regarding the oil exports, Bazargan said that his country will begin exporting soon to all the world including the United States.49
Islamic Republic Party (IRP) as an Agent of the U.S.
Hajuat Al-Islam Ali Tehrani, a religious figure in Mashad, sent a letter to Khomeini charging three Ayatollahs, among tl1em Ayatollah Beheshti, the Secretary of the Revolution Council, of having a connection witl1 the United States and attempting to take over the authority. Hajuat Al-Islam, in his letter, published in the Islamic Republic newspaper on January l 9, 1980, charged Beheshti, Hash RaLsanjani, a former Minister of Interior (the current president), and Ali-Khameni, the former Imam of Tehran's Mosque and the current spiritual leader, of trying to seize the authority by nominating Jalaeddin Farsi to represent the IRP in the election. He also said that it is the students' duty to uncover the documents they found in the Embassy which will prove that these three figures are guilty together with Abbas Amir Entezam, the former government spokesman who was imprisoned as a spy for the United States.50
Abbas Amir Entezam, one of key figure was known to be a CIA agent. After the occupation of the Iranian Embassy, some documents were discovered which confirmed his relationship with the CIA.51
Rouhani: "The Americans Gave Us the Green Light"
In an interview with Paris-Match magazine, Ayatollah Hamid Rouhani said:
"The army was in the hands of its 40,000 American advisors. From the moment when America gave the green light -- and I am convinced that America gave us the green light -- the army could no longer do anything except what it is doing today: An honorable fight in fidelity to its oath to the Shah. When it understands that it is face to face with a revolution and not just a riot, it will fall into the hands of the people."52
Habibi was the Revolution Council's spokesman, and once he was a nominee for the Iranian presidency. He has been accused by more than one organization in Iran, and his name was brought forth in Counter Spy magazine with the information that he had been called to the U.S. when he officially entered the CIA on May 15, 1963.53
Ibrahim Yazdi
Yazdi studied for sixteen years in tl1e United States, and he had both the American citizenship along with his Iranian citizenship (his wife and children carried only the American citizenship).54 Yazdi was formerly responsible for the activities and the hostile demonstrations against the Shah when he visited the White House in November of 1977. The newspapers found it strange, at the time, that Carter did not take the proper kind of action against the demonstrators.55
In a talk with the United States Press on March l, l 979, Senator Jim Abu Rezk said that he gave Khomeini's representative, Ibrahim Yazdi, some political as well as non-political support in Washington. He also helped to free the students who had been arrested in the demonstration against the Shah on February 2, 1978. When Yazdi was the Foreign Minister, it was his idea of not cutting but improving relations with the U.S.56 He also negotiated with some American figures to import some military spare parts. Yazdi, together with Bazar, an agent ,Brezezinski in Algiers in November 1, 1979, three days before the American Embassy had been taken over.
Yazdi is still active in Iran. He is the leader of the "liberation movement of Iran": an opposition movement working with in the system to give the Iranian system legitimacy.
As we can see, the high figures in the Iranian Revolution did have a connection with the United States. After all of this, how can we believe that the Revolution was clean. This is also reinforced from the Islamic point of view which forbids the Muslims to cooperate with the enemies of Allah, the enemies of Islam, and the enemies of the Muslims. Also, if we examine the Iranian Constitution, we will find that, although it is good for a Western country, it has no similarity to the Islamic Constitution which would define an Islamic country. We can criticize the Iranian Constitution from the Islamic perspective, but it is not the subject of this paper.
After all this evidence, how could anybody believe that Khomeini was an Islamic leader or that he was sent to bring justice? Some may argue that there were some polluted figures in the Revolution, that Khomeini did not know, or that he knew about them and tried to eliminate them. This is not the first time in recent history that this occurred, as when Nasser claimed to be the leader for the Arabs. The same thing happened in Iran, except that instead of Nasser carrying the slogan of Pan-Arabism, Khomeini carried the slogan of Islam.
The imperialist nations are always thinking ahead and they have to, to maintain their domination in the world. After brining Khomeini to power, the US had already made a back up plan of bringing "secularist" to power, in case the revolution failed or got out of hands. However, the revolution succeeded. Now, the US had to control it, so that the situation did not get out of hands. In pursuing this policy, Iraq's Saddam Hussein was 'encouraged' to attack Iran. Saddam Hussein thought that the Iran "could not withstand an attack for long, because its air force was nonexistent. The army had a combat capability of zero, the navy 10 percent. The Iraqi were not far of the mark", Bani Sadr wrote in his book. Bani Sadr continues, "and had they [Iraqis] attacked then, would have had every chance of a rapid victory. But they had not received the green light from the United States."57
Coming to power with the United States assistanh58, Khomeini was certain that no one would attack Iran. Saddam on the other hand was certain that the war would be a simple exercise. who put these ideas into their heads, Bani Sadr asks in his book.
In July of 1980, Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had met Saddam Hussein . He prepared a report for Carter, "explaining that the Iran-Iraq war was consistent with American policy in the region."59
On September 22, 1980, Iraq attacked Iran. With in hours, Iraqi tanks crossed Iranian borders at several points and the Iranian air bases were bombed. Iran was able to survive the initial Iraqi attacks and launched their own attacks after a few days. So, began the long 8 years of Iran-Iraq war, where Muslims were the only losers. Nearly 30O,000 Muslims died, just from the Iran side.
For the American government, this is nothing new. The history has proven that they are able to wipe a whole race just for the measly worldly possession, such as the case with the American Indians. For the Persian Gulf, American strategy was simple, which was to destabilize the region, by having one boogie man. Khomenie was a perfect man for this job. In the end, it was the US economy which benefited from this policy of destabilization. The Saudi's stepped up oil production as a result of the war and thus made the 'black gold' cheap for the Americans.
To maximize their gain, the Americans supplied weapons to both Iran and Iraq. It was reported that "the US subsidiaries all around the world found Iran to be an excellent customer because the Mullah paid top market prices."60
Initially, the US began to support Iraq with weapon and intelligence in 1982, when it appeared that Iran might be winning.6 1 The Regan administration secretly decided to provide highly classified intelligence to Iraq in the spring of 1982, while also permitting the sale of American-made arms to Baghdad in a successful effort to help Saddam Hussein avert imminent defeat in the war with Iran, former intelligence and State Department officials say. The American decision to lend crucial help to Baghdad so early in the war came after American intelligence agencies warned that Iraq was on the verge of being overrun by Iran, whose army was bolstered the year before by convert shipment of American-made weapons. The New York Times and others reported last year that the Regan administration secretly decided shortly after taking office in January 1981 to allow Israel to ship several billion dollars worth of American arms and spare parts to Iran."62
Iran was even forced to buy the American weapons, to defend against Iraq. The Americans urged Iraq to carry out air strikes deep inside Iran. The plan was conceived during the Iran-lraq war as pressure tactic intended to force Iran to turn to the United States for sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to repel the Iraqi attacks. The United States could then use its increased leverage with Iran to press Teheran to free
American hostages being held by pro-lranian groups in Lebanon. When asked about this information, White House spokeswoman, Laura Mellilo, told Reuters 'This is nothing new."'63
Americas objectives were being achieved by this war. There was a deliberate attempt to create no winners, no losers in order to keep the area destabilized. As a result, America was "gaining control of the revolution, control over OPEC was reestablished... Three other objectives described in the reports seized in the embassy were as yet unattained: using the Iran-Iraq war to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf, stabilizing the regimes in the region, and establishing military bases for the American strike forces."64 (This situation w as early the Iran-Iraq war. However, as we know, these goals are now already achieved by the US.)
When it seemed like Iran was gaining an edge in the war, the Americans decided to go all out to help Iraq even overtly, because the United States did not want the revolution to get out of hand. To help Iraq, Washington removed it from the list of nations supporting terrorism, enabling trade with the US to resume. Agricultural Sales and export-import bank credits were restored, as were diplomatic relations. "The US also shared with Iraq, military intelligence on the deployment of Iranian forces. 'Operation Staunch', was launched to stem the flow of arms to Iran. Washington turned an indifferent eye toward allied arms deals with Baghdad."65
In 1987, Iraq was becoming desperate. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on Iran. An important question comes to mind is that who provided Iraqis with technology and the know how to deliver these chemical weapons? [Band Sadr mentions in his book that, the Soviets and Germans supplied the plans and training, and the French sold them 40 percent of the guns So, where did the other 60 percent of the guns to deliver the chemical weapons come from?]
By now it was obvious that the United States wanted the war to end. Most of their objectives were being fulfilled. Now they wanted to get Saddam Hussien, who had been in the British camp to join the American camp, like Iran.
By mid-1987, the American Navy started escorting Kuwaiti tankers (bearing US flags) through the Strait of Hormz and punished Iran for interfering with the tankers. The same year an Iranian airliner was shot down, killing 290 Muslims. This was seen "as the precursor of other catastrophes. if Iran did not immediately agree to the cessation of hostilities."66
On July 20, 1988 Iran accepted the cease-fire. After agreeing to cease-fire agreement, Khomeini declared publicly, I have sold my honor; I have swallowed the poison of defeat.i~67
As expected, the Americans profited from both the war and its conclusion.
It is well known that during and after the Iran-Iraq war, Americans were building Iraq in hope of making him the "police man" of the Gulf, or at least to deter Iran from taking any 'threatening' moves. This strategy appeared in may State Department document beginning in the fall of 1988, but it did not appear in a major policy document until presidential National Security Directive NSD-26, signed by President Bush on October 2, 1988. The directive stated:
"Normal relations between tile US and Iraq world serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq... [Also], we should pursue and seek to facilitate opportunities for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy... where they do not conflict with our non-proliferation .. objectives.... The US should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges."68
Policy of trying to build up Iraq to be the policeman failed miserably, leading to the Gulf 'war'. We are not going to discuss this war at any length, because it is out of the scope of the discussion. Seeing their failure, the US changed its policy from building up Iran or Iraq to "a strategy of dual containment". "This policydeparts from the past US practice of helping to build ~,~ one of the countries in hopes of balancing the other's military and political influence" a US official said. He also said, "the new US objective is to ensure that both Iran and Iraq remain equally weak for an indefinite period. The [Clinton] administration's principal approach is to ensnare both countries in a tight web of international trade restrictions meant to deprive them of the income and technology they need to develop new armaments' pursue terrorism, foment revolutions or intimidate their neighbors."69
41 Iran Time Magazine, March 5, 1979.
42 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 449
43 Ibid., p. 450.
44 Ibid., p, 452.
45 "Face the Nation," CBS, February 25, l 979.
46 Al-Hawadess, No. 1 163, London, February 16, 1979, p.29.
47 Ibid.
48 Henry Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 198 l ), pp. 17.- 187.
49 New York Times, February l 8, l 979, pp. 1, 14
50 Islamic Republic, January 19, 1980, p.2
51 "NVDI comments on Entezam A Test," FBIS, December 26, 1979, pp. Sup. 23-24
52 George Menant, Translation by Dr. Marshall Windmiller, "A interroge L'ayatollah Rouhani Chef de la communaute chiite d'Europe," Paris Match, No. 1550, February 19, 1979, pp. 64-65
53 John Kelly, "The CIA in the Middle East," Counter Spy, November/December 1978, p. 13
54 Al-Hawadess, No. 1171, p. 37.
55 Al-Nahan Arab and international, Paris, May 20, 1978.
56 Carter, p. 453
57 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, Page 69.
58 Iran Times, October 20, 1989, Page 8., A quote by Richard Cottam, an Iranian specialist and a professor- at the University of Pittsburgh.
59 Ibid., page 70.
60 Newsday, March 20, 1991, Page 6.
61 Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush. (New York: William Morrow and Co. 1993.)
62 New York Times, Sunday, January 26, 1992.
63 Ibid., New Yorker Magazine, November 2, l 992.
64 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 144.
65 Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1992.
66 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 214.
67 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 215
68 The White House, presidential documents, Presidential Determination Number 90-7 of January 17, 1990, Application of export-import Bank Restrictions in Connection with Iraq, P. 1.
69 The Washington Post, Sunday, May 23, 1993.
Source: http://islamicvideostube.blogspot.com/2010/08/part-3-iran-and-revolution.html
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